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I. INTRODUCTION
The question presented by the issue of enforceability of mediated
agreements is not the question of which types of problems ought to be
mediated and which litigated. Still the reasons one gives for one's answer
to the latter question reflect the basic understandings of the two processes
that will affect one's conclusions about enforceability. In this essay I
try to describe why, in the most general terms, mediation may be
employed as well as litigation and thus why, again at that same level
of generality, persons who first mediate may then properly decide to
litigate. I assert that this sequence from problematic relationship to
necessarily partial consensual resolution to litigation is a sequence that
contract law generally takes account of, though scholars differ as to
the significance and interpretation of relational and consensual aspects.
Mediation as the chosen way from problematic relationship to con-
sensual resolution does not, I conclude, so alter the nature of relationship
or consent as to justify a separate rule on enforceability, though the
considerations that may suggest mediation rather than litigation may
also lead a contracts court not to find enforceability. I find that the
real concern that argues for non-enforceability is an understandable fear
that the possibility of litigation may in various ways distort the course
of mediation. Those concerns are real but should be addressed in ways
other than adopting a special rule on enforceability for mediated
agreements.
The substantive contexts within which mediation occurs vary enor-
mously.' This partially explains why very little of a systematic nature
has been written about the generalized topic of the enforceability of
mediated agreements.2 Contract mediation and grievance mediation in
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1. See e.g., 29 U.S.C., § 172 (1982) (function of Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service in general labor relations); 45 U.S.C. § 155 (1982) (mediation of labor relations
within railway industry); 25 U.S.C. § 640d (1982) (mediation of Native American tribes'
claims); CAL. CIVIL CODE § 4607 (West 1983), KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-601 to 23-603
(Supp. 1985) & OR. REV. STAT. §§ 107.755-107.785 (1984) (custody and visitation disputes);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.19, §§ 636, 665 (Supp. 1986) (annulment and divorce); CONN.
GEN. STAT. §§ 54-56m (1985) (minor criminal cases); HA. REV. STAT. §§ 571-31.4 (Supp.
1984) (mediation of juvenile offenses by neighborhood panels); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-42-
5.1 (1984) (mediation and arbitration of consumer disputes); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-
216 (1973) (mediation for mobile home owners); FLA. STAT. § 44.201 (Supp. 1986) &
MINN. STAT. § 494.01 (Supp. 1987) (general community dispute resolution).
2. Freedman, Are Mediation Agreements Enforceable? ABA Special Committee on
Dispute Resolution (1981); ABA Special Comm. on Dispute Resolution, Briefing: En-
forceability (1981).
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the labor field, neighborhood justice mediation of landlord-tenant disputes
or consumer complaints or neighbors' property disputes, and mediation
of disputes of continuing or divorcing families present vastly different
personal and legal contexts within which mediation may take place and
result in agreements. In addition, there exists a major procedural divide
with significant variations from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Many me-
diated agreements are entered as court orders after searching judicial
scrutiny and these agreements are subject to widely varying rules as
to finality and remedy for violation.'
Unlike the subjects of confidentiality and liability, enforceability is
not an issue specific to the subject of mediation; rather, enforceability
issues arise under contract law and civil or criminal procedure. This
wide variety of applications makes apparent the fact that enforceability
is not amenable to universally applicable model legislation. The question
here was whether the mediated nature of some agreements should
necessarily lead to legal consequences for enforceability. The proposed
legislation embodies the conclusion that the mediated nature of an
agreement may tell very little about whether it should be enforced.
Asking the question of the enforceability of mediated agreements does
not, then, cut at the joints of the general problem of enforceability of
agreements. This seems true whether or not the agreement is entered
as a consent decree or other final order.
II. MEDIATION AND ENFORCEABILITY: THE OPTIONS
Legislation controlling the enforceability of mediated agreements
could take several forms. Of course, legislation could embody different
3. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) ("A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise
shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.") with
FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) ("[An action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order
of court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party
of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs, or (ii) by
filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action.
Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without
prejudice, except that a notice of a dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits
when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of the United States or
of any state an action based on or including the same claim.").
4. See e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5); Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond:
Modification of Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 64 TEx. L. REv. (1986). The deter-
mination that a certain order will be given a lesser or greater degree of finality may be
a function of the operation of purely procedural rules (prescribing, for example, that the
order was procedurally a final, not an interlocutory order, since it did in fact dispose of
all matters in controversy and did so "with prejudice.") See e.g., 6A MOORE, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 59-01 et. seq. (2d ed. 1986). On the other hand, it may evince a
substantive judgment that certain kinds of orders ought not lightly to be modified. Some
state laws have ascribed this higher degree of finality to child custody decrees, in order
to embody a normative judgment that stability was important to children's psychological
wellbeing. See e.g., ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 40, para. 610 (Supp. 1986).
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rules in different substantive areas. As I will explain at greater length
below, all the rules must be formulated in relationship to the contract
law that generally controls enforceability. It would, I think, be wholly
inappropriate to attempt, in an a priori manner, to specify the contexts
in which one rule would apply rather than another. All I can hope to
do is to set out the major considerations in favor of adopting the rule
which, it seems to me, ought in general, to be adopted' and then the
considerations that weigh in favor of the other rules. The question of
whether, in a particular context, with all its dense legal and social
complexity, those considerations weigh in favor of an alternative rule,
must be an issue of political judgment.6
For example, a mediated agreement might be enforceable under the
same circumstances as other agreements, applying contract doctrine.
These enforceability rules might or might not be codified.7 Another
option is that the mediation could be enforceable where, but for the
mediation, the agreement would be unenforceable under contract law.
The mediation might be enforceable only if the agreement contains an
express clause stating that the mediation will be enforceable in a court
of law. On the other hand, the mediation might generally be enforceable
unless the parties expressly agree that it not be enforceable. Finally,
mediated agreements might never be enforceable, even if the parties
expressly agree to enforceability.
The necessary background to any discussion of model legislation
affecting the enforceability of mediated agreements must be the brooding
omnipresence of contract and contract law. The following discussion of
model legislation is divided into two steps. First I discuss the implications
of simply allowing "pre-existent" contract law to determine enforcea-
bility. Second, I try to imagine the considerations that would lead to
the adoption of another rule. In the end, I do not find those considerations
persuasive, largely because contract law is itself such a flexible instru-
ment and the considerations which would weigh in favor or against
enforceability already exist, albeit in a manner which cannot determine,
5. It's the peculiar nature of the "rule" that I think ought to be adopted that saves
this itself from being a bit of a priorism.
6. See R. BEINER. POLITICAL JUDGMENT (1983).
7. On the advantages and effects of codification of common law rules see Gilmore,
On Statutory Obsolescence, 39 U. COLO. L. REv. 461 (1967); Stone, A Primer on
Codification, 29 TUL L. REv. 303 (1955).
8. This option is not truly discontinuous with the second option since contract law
itself addresses the question of whether a provision in an agreement that the agreement
not be enforceable is itself "enforceable." Contracts providing that the parties intend that
the agreement not be enforceable in court are common, especially in international trade.
I CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 8 (Kaufman Supp., 1984) 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRAcrs §
21 (1959). Normally, courts will honor such contractual stipulations. Id.; Kind v. Clark,
161 F.2d 36 (1947); In re H. Hicks & Son, 82 F.2d 277 (1936). I include it as a separate
option merely to make the possibility of such a stipulation explicit.
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in the strongest sense, the outcome in particular cases.9
III. THE CONTRACTS BACKGROUND
Contract law contains a set of flexible doctrines that bear on the
issue of the enforceability of agreements. Of course, much has been
written on the basic issue of contract formation: the requirement of
"parties, consent, consideration and obligation[,] "'t all of which are
traditional elements required before courts will find enforceable con-
tractual obligation. Beyond the doctrines that articulate the prima facie
elements of contract formation, there is a second set that embodies
defenses to enforcement. Some affect the quality of assent to be bound
and, as one would expect, commentators have sought to justify these
doctrines" in ways consistent with their basic justifying principles of
contract law. 2
Another set of doctrines relating to assent to be bound concern
"mistake."' 3 Other doctrines define the situations under which misre-
presentations, positive concealment, and failures to disclose may serve
to defeat the enforceability of an agreement. 4 Where a party threatens
criminal action or other physical or economic injury, even under some
9. This is not to assert that contract doctrine, particularly in its systematic elaborations,
is the sole source of the considerations that contracts courts find persuasive. See Gordon,
Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law, 1985
Wis. L. REv. 565, 576 (courts actually invoke distributive and paternalistic norms not
embodied in contracts doctrine). Nor is it to assert that contract law is free from internal
stresses. Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 STAN. L. REV. 753 (1981).
10. Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U.S. 679 (1877). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS §§ 9, 18, 71 (1981).
11. See e.g., Levin & McDowell, The Balance Theory of Contracts: Seeking Justice
in Voluntary Obligations. 29 MCGILL L.J. 24, 54-63 (1983).
12. The agreements of infants and persons suffering from mental illness, for example,
are in many situations voidable by the child or mentally ill person. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS §§ 14, 15 (1981); 1 CORBIN. supra note 8, at §§ 6, 146, 147, 227. In
some jurisdictions, the child may disaffirm the contract only upon the return of consid-
eration, see 1 WILLISTON, supra note 8, at § 238, and in others certain contracts by
minors will be enforceable on policy grounds, such as those in which a minor agrees to
support an illegitimate child or by which he agrees to pay for necessities, the former
rationalized on "public policy" grounds and the latter perhaps on a theory of "quasi-
contract." 1 CORBIN, supra note 8, at 19. Likewise, difficult distinctions are made between
mental illnesses affecting control over behavior. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 15 (1981). It is not unusual, at least in the neighborhood justice context, for mediators
to involve minors or persons with mental illness. 3 CORBIN. supra note 8, §§ 597-605.
13. Here again one finds a complex set of interrelated doctrines and exceptions subject
to varying interpretation and justification. The second party's awareness of a misstatement
of the first person's intention, one party's awareness that the other party attached a
differing interpretation to an ambiguous contract term, the mutuality of mistake, and the
moral and policy considerations bearing on the assignment of the risk of unilateral mistake,
and the level of fault that inheres in the particular mistake may all bear on the question
of enforceability.
14. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980).
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circumstances, where the latter is not criminal or tortious, the doctrine
of duress may defeat the enforceability of an agreement'5 and, where
a fiduciary relationship exists, the doctrine of undue influence may have
the same effect. 6 Most jurisdictions recognize the defense of uncons-
cionability; the law governing the extent to which courts will invalidate,
as unfair, terms in contracts of adhesion is quickly developing. 7 Then
there is the whole range of doctrines that bar enforceability of contracts
on public policy grounds, such as contracts to perform criminal or
tortious acts, contracts that violate the antitrust laws, or those which
impair family relationships.'8 Another set of doctrines, which have often
been developed in a specific substantive legal context, define the set of
circumstances under which a person may relieve another of duties or
liability imposed by statute or common law. 9
I review this hornbook law only to illustrate the great range of
questions that surround the question of the enforceability of any agree-
ments, whether mediated or not. Many of the legal standards in this
area are so open-textured that highly individualized equitable consid-
erations may affect the determination of a judge or jury as to whether
a particular agreement ought to be enforced.
The most generalized question for possible legislation is whether the
mediated nature of some agreements should have consequences for
enforceability which modify, as a matter of law,2 the rules that would
otherwise apply to determine enforceability. It is possible that state
legislation could give the mere fact of mediation specific legal enforce-
ability. This would serve to preclude the introduction of all evidence
relevant to the traditional contract defenses. I believe that such a policy
wrongly ignores policy considerations that support allowing defenses such
as those utilized in contract law.'
I say "as a matter of law" because events that transpired in the
course of a mediation that resulted in an agreement are obviously relevant
to many of the contract doctrines that affect enforceability of that
agreement. The party's performance during the course of the mediation
15. 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1603 (1959).
16. Id. at § 1625. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981) § 177.
17. 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 128 (1963).
18. 6A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1373-78 (1963).
19. See e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 9-201 (1984) (waivers of notices of termination
in standard lease valid).
20. For example, a rule might be adopted, following Option Number 1 described
above, that provided that juveniles may be permitted to bind themselves contractually if
the agreement was the result of a mediation. If mediators' self-understanding and reliably
observed professional ethics required them to enhance the understanding and quality of
the minor's deliberation and to prevent "unfair" results, this rule might recommend itself
to a greater degree. Such rules would tend to make more sense where, as in the example,
they served to qualify a broad generalization.
21. See supra notes 12, 13.
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may provide evidence of his mental capacity to contract. It may be
apparent from statements made during the mediation that one party
knew or did not know that the other party was misstating his intention
in the final agreement (though the relatively full discussion of terms in
the presence of a perceptive third party should make this less likely).
Furthermore, the presence of and action of the mediator in the course
of the mediation may well be evidence of one party's knowledge of
facts or law or the full consideration given to the (extraordinary) risks
involved in a certain agreement. What the mediator saw, heard, and
did may itself be relevant to the issue of enforceability. Under most
circumstances, and in the absence of a special rule affecting mediation,
the presence of a mediator acting according to what I assume to be
the standards generally applicable to the conduct of mediation, will
increase the likelihood that an agreement will be found enforceable by
improving the parties' knowledge and the quality of their deliberation.
A more generalized argument from contract law would rely not on
events that occurred during the mediation but on the mere fact that
mediation took place. The fact that the parties engaged in mediation
evidences the parties' (or at least the initiating party's) intent to be
bound. All contracts are interpreted against the background of the
relationships between or among the parties and there are, of course,
many opportunities short of seeking out the help of a third party to
reach agreement. Traditionally, many persons have gone to third parties
(older relatives; ministers) because their previous understandings of their
relationships have not held up. Even in these more informal settings,
the course of their dealings might well indicate that what they were
seeking was precisely a more formal agreement that would have the
added sanction at least of the disapproval of the third party. When
parties seek out a mediator to allow them to reach an agreement,
generally they are seeking a formalization, with legal effect, of a
relationship that has become problematic. The very fact that the parties
have entered into mediation illustrates their mutual commitment to a
relatively greater resort to public norms than would an attempt to resolve
the problematic situation privately.
The question that this raises closely intersects with the issue of
confidentiality and evidentiary privilege in mediation and again points
out the tension between the spirit and needs of the two forums. Where
one of the traditional defenses to contract enforceability is raised, the
mediator will often have evidence, perhaps the best evidence, going to
the issue of mistake or knowing assumption of risk. Further, he or she
will often have an opinion, in some circumstances admissible either as
an expert or at least as lay witness opinion, regarding one of the
[Vol. 2:1 19861
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participant's state of mind.?2 The evidence may come from statements
made either by one of the parties or by the mediator himself (where
notice is a crucial issue) either in joint session or in caucus. This may
well be the context within which at least some issues of confidentiality
and evidentiary privilege arise. It is, of course, also possible that a party
seeking to void a mediated agreement might seek to introduce evidence
to the effect that the mediator actively misinformed him of the facts,
the law or the evidence, or perhaps, evidence of more subtle kinds of
psychological pressure.' Attention ought to be given to these contract
defenses, particularly duress and mistake, in framing codes of mediator
ethics either at the state level or within particular agencies, especially
if the mediator is representing that the agreement will be enforceable.24
An issue closely related to mediator ethics (and potential liability)
is the responsibility of the mediator to the enforceability of the agree-
ment. Macaulay's empirical studies of the behavior of businessmen in
the formation of commercial contracts found that businessmen often
gave very little thought at the time of agreement to the legal effect of
many contract provisions that they believed important:
There was a time when courts in the United States refused to enforce a
contract in which the seller agreed to supply all of the buyer's requirements
of particular goods. Insofar as these decisions had any policy basis, they
appear to express the belief that sellers ought not assume a commitment,
22. FED. R. EVID. 701-05. One participant at the Ohio State conference recounted a
story where a participant in mediation undertook litigation to challenge the other party's
interpretation of a term in the mediated agreement. He did this only because he was
aware that, under the controlling statute, the mediator himself would not be permitted
to testify to the meaning of the term that was clearly understood by the parties as a
basis for the agreement. This is an example of a case where a rule designed to further
the process of mediation leads to a kind of corruption because of the relationship between
mediation and litigation.
23. Duress need not be at the hands of another party to the contract. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(2) (1981) provides: "If a party's manifestation of assent
is induced by one who is not a party to the transaction, the contract is voidable by the
victim unless the other party to the transaction in good faith and without reason to know
of the duress either gives value or relies materially on the transaction." There is also a
trend toward enlarging the sorts of "pressure" that may constitute duress beyond the
traditional threats to life and limb. Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 20 N.J. 359, 361, 120 A.2d
11, 11 (1956) ("Under the modem view, moral compulsion or psychological pressure may
constitute duress if, thereby, the subject of the pressure is overborne and he is deprived
of the exercise of his free will, and the question is whether consent was coerced.") But
see Regenold v. Baby Fold, Inc., 68 Il.2d 419, 433, 369 N.E.2d 858, 864 (1977), appeal
dismissed 435 U.S. 963, 98 S.Ct. 1598, 56 L.Ed. 2d 54 (1978) ("mere advice, argument,
or persuasion does not constitute duress or undue influence" by a state agency which
persuaded a mother under extreme personal stress to give up a child for adoption).
24. Here it might well be relevant that mediators in general or the mediating agency
for which the mediator works measures its success by the percentage of mediations in
which agreements are reached. It would certainly seem that cross-examiners worth their
salt would pursue this line vigorously in a case to defeat enforcement of the agreement.
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fixed price while receiving so little in return. Clbrtis Reitz notes that one
legal scholar said that such a rule had wreaked havoc within the commercial
community. But it did no such thing: the commercial community continued
to make "requirements" contracts, apparently unconcerned whether or not
they would be legally enforceable. This business relationship was too useful
to sacrifice by invoking the formal rules of contract law.,,
In the vast majority of cases both sides substantially perform as
agreed. In those cases, concern with legal enforceability may prevent
the parties from reaching an agreement that is in their interests. It is
often the case that in the course of mediation the parties will come to
an agreement some terms of which are legally unenforceable. This is
especially true where the party against whom the unenforceable provision
operates gains the benefit of other provisions of the agreement and then
himself fails to perform.
Should a mediator be ethically or legally responsible to ensure the
enforceability of a mediated agreement? Should he be responsible to at
least raise the issue when he has reason to believe that the agreement
may not be legally enforceable? Is the mediator responsible for being
informed of the legal issues surrounding enforceability in the areas in
which he mediates? Is there a different responsibility if the mediator
is a lawyer? What if he or she in fact knows that a particular provision
is not enforceable?
I have here suggested that contract law already contains the doctrines
relevant to the question of enforceability of agreements, mediated or
not, and have tried to indicate in a preliminary way some of the collateral
issues that the interrelation of mediation and litigation pose. In the next
section I want to take a broad perspective in considering whether
mediated agreements should be irrebuttably unenforceable, thus allowing
for a sharp wedge to be driven between mediation and litigation.
IV. MODELS OF MEDIATION AND LITIGATION
The relationship between mediation and litigation involves very basic
and very subtle questions.26 I hope to lay out some of the interconnections
25. Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the Complexities of Contract.
II LAW & Socvy REV. 507, 524 (1977).
26. I shall in general assume that the legislative perspective on the question of
enforceability should not differ markedly from that of a common law court making the
same determination. That assumption is the result of the argument to the effect that
there is no inexorable moral, logical, or legal conceptual link between the mediated nature
of an agreement and its enforceability. Thus I support the symposium consensus as a
matter of policy that "An agreement reached as a result of mediation shall be enforceable
under the law which governs enforceability of agreements generally." It is difficult,
however, to conceive of the legislative context within which such a general statement
would be appropriate. Most legislation controlling mediation has, for good reason, been
much more context-specific.
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of possible resolutions of this question to the competing metaphors
through which we think about mediation, legislation, and litigation. At
stake is the relative importance of and appropriate relationships between
two different modes of social ordering, mediation and litigation. This is
not a simple matter.
Insofar as one contemplates model legislation, one must consider the
degree to which or the manner in which the concrete practice of
mediation ought to take account of litigation, the other means of social
ordering to which the parties may eventually resort. Which casts and
ought to cast the stronger shadow: mediation or litigation? 7 Which
should adapt its practice to which, and in what contexts?'
The considerations that bear on the issue of the enforceability of
mediated agreements are the same considerations that have long been
discussed in a different idiom by contracts scholars. The latter have
sharply disagreed as to whether the promise itself or the overall context
of the relationship is the source of contractual obligation.2 From a
"promise-centered" perspective, the agreement struck after mediation
will generally be entitled to enforcement as a promise, though the factual
circumstances surrounding the mediation obviously affect the extent to
which the promise ought to be enforced. The mediation process is viewed
as the means by which parties are able to reach the "meeting of minds"
which is embodied in the agreement. 0 From a more "relational" per-
spective, the mediation is not so much a means by which to reach the
crucial meeting of minds but, rather, an intensive part3' of a process
27. Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1984).
28. Mediator tort immunities or "privilege" may be examples of litigation "taking
account" of the distinctive needs of mediation and to "compromising" its own procedures.
Alternatively, a requirement, enforceable in tort, that the mediator discuss explicitly the
legal enforceability of each of the terms of an agreement may "compromise" the practice
of mediation.
29. Compare C. FRIED, CONTRACT As PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OB-
LIGATION (1981) with I. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980) and LEVIN &
McDOWELL, supra note 11.
30. Very basic questions of categories were at issue in the Ohio State discussion. One
view forcefully presented was that mediation was not truly mediation but only "therapy"
if it did not lead to a legally enforceable agreement. There is, as is inevitable, a very
interesting implicit typology of human relations at work here. These questions of what
therapy, mediation, and trials "are" presuppose the most basic philosophical commitments
and are unintelligible without a full explication of these background commitments. See
A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981) (basic discontinuity between moral and therapeutic
discourse). Many of the debates surrounding alternative dispute resolution are really about
the appropriate discourse within which certain kinds of problematic relations "ought(!)"
to be discussed - therapeutic, moral, political, legal. See PITKIN. WITTGENSTEIN AND
JUSTICE 15 1-52 (1972) (attempting to identify and relativize the "moral" mode of addressing
interpersonal conflict). An adequate answer requires a careful analysis of the "spirit" and
structure of each of those modes of discourse - what they allow to be brought to light
and what they leave unsaid and unexamined.
31. Lifting the relationship into the medium of words in a context of equality may,
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by which the relatiQnship between the parties is constituted or, more
likely, reconstituted.2
The "agreement" reached must be viewed as one element in an
ongoing relation between the parties in which the process of mediation
itself may be a very important part. Additionally, the discussion among
contract scholars33 as to the relative importance of "promise" has a kind
of procedural parallel in the disagreements among mediators as to the
value of "pure agreement" as opposed to a substantively good agreement
in the context of the parties' ongoing relation. There are elements of
each emphasis in contract law which resonate strongly with sometimes
conflicting values in mediators' self-understanding. And so the issue of
the enforceability of mediated agreements is part of a much broader
conversation,34 something the proposed model legislation's deference to
developing contract law recognizes.
I want to expand somewhat on the model33 of mediation and litigation
that emerges from a relational perspective. From that perspective, me-
diation is the process by which the parties undergo a real change in
their attitudes toward each other; only it in that way is too pale. Under
the relational model, the process of mediation transforms the relationship
between the parties while at the same time ensuring that the resulting
relationship preserves the identities of the parties. To use the philo-
sophical terms, the relationship is real and internal.36 However, this
relationship is often difficult to construct between two opposing persons.
Though it is customary to contrast mediation with litigation and view
the former as "conciliatory" and the latter as adversarial, this is a
contrast that ought not be overdone and should, at the very least, be
carefully specified. In litigation, the "fight" often takes place through
of course, have important effects. See B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL
STATE (1980); J. HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (1975). Those most suspicious of
mediation tend to doubt that the verbal medium does anything to alter preexisting power
relationships. See e.g., Woods, Mediation: A Backlash to Women's Progress on Family
Law Issues, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 431 (1985).
32. Compare Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305
(1971) with PITKIN, supra note 30, at 151, on the distinctive kind of language used in
this attempt to constitute a relationship in which the parties have diverse interests and
perspectives yet have a common concern in maintaining a common "public world" or
"constitution."
33. This disagreement necessarily has both descriptive and normative elements - it
is about both what courts do in fact do and what they ought to do - though that
distinction itself has only a limited value.
34. It is no accident that a scholar with a strongly relational notion of contract and
with a rich "conservative" appreciation of values implicit in the large range of exchange
relations will tend strongly to favor mediation as opposed to litigation as a method of
dispute resolution. Whitford, Ian Macneil's Contribution to Contracts Scholarship, 1985
Wis. L. REV. 545, 551.
35. See, I. G. BARBUR, MYTHS, MODELS, AND PARADIGMS (1974).
36. A. WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY (1929); A. WHITEHEAD. SCIENCE AND
THE MODERN WORLD (1929).
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attorneys, the "violence" is highly stylized,37 and the party himself can
often stay relatively disengaged. In many ways the stance of the pure
adversary is relatively disengaged since "positions" - even on relatively
simple "issues of fact" - tend to be dictated by extrinsic strategic con-
cerns and not by personally engaging the normative questions they present.
In contrast, in mediation the level of interpersonal tension" can be
much higher than in litigation. This is because in litigation, a party is
often a relatively disengaged lay official, merely watching his field
commander make all the important decisions in a winner-take-all con-
text." In mediation, the parties themselves must confront each other
face to face. However, the function of this confrontation is to encourage
each party to "take account" or imagine the other party's perspective
in a way that can be very "dis-integrating" or "dis-membering" for
the personality that comes to the mediation. The hope is, of course,
that the personality may be reintegrated in a way that better accounts
for the other's perspective.
As I will note later,4 ' mediation has proven most successful in situations
where the relationships among the parties are more or less intimate and
where some degree of unity as to basic commitments and interests exists.
The relationship between mediation and litigation ought to be understood,
under this relational model, quite differently in these different contexts.
The difficulties in questions of enforceability stem largely from the
impossibility of subsuming these different sorts of relations under one
generalized formula.
In these ideal situations, the parties are "taking account" of one
another's perspectives in a way that aspires to unity of perspective,
where each contributes according to his abilities and each receives
according to his needs with purity of heart. Lon Fuller suggested, in
effect, that this was the "natural home" of mediation .4 He also rec-
ognized, however, that mediation is employed in contexts where there
remains far less than full unity of perspective, and where the task is
that of "creating unity ... in a context of diversity, rival claims, and
conflicting interests. '43 The conversation that goes on in mediation, like
politics, is often "neither just manipulative propaganda, nor just a moral
concern with the cares and commitments of another person, but rather
is something like addressing diverse views in terms which relate their
37. Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L.
REv. 487 (1980).
38. I use the amorphous "tension" rather than "opposition" or "conflict" since these
sports or martial metaphors can easily be misleading.
39. J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 34-35 (1964).
40. M. TAYLOR. JOURNEYS To SELFHOOD 159 (1980).
41. See infra text accompanying notes 62 to 63.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 56 to 59.
43. PITKIN. supra note 30, at 215.
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
separate, plural interests to their common enterprise, to a shared public
interest."" It is no accident that the language just quoted refers spe-
cifically to political discourse - to truly deliberative discussion in the
classical sense. The degree and manner to which the processes of
mediation are analogous to political discourse will vary greatly from
context to context, depending on the degree of unity of interest."
I will now trace the natural implication of a relational notion of
mediation in situations where unity of interest does not exist. When a
"dispute" arises and the situation has become "problematical,"" the
natural inclination of a relational mode of thought would be to re-
mediate, that is, once again to attempt to readjust the parties' relationship
through the medium of words.47 The question is: What is distinctive
about "enforcement," which necessarily means "enforcement through
litigation," such that it should be a complement to mediation?
By resorting to litigation, a participant in mediation has decided to
"stand on her rights," to move to a forum where the language is
generally "rights-based." A number of reasons for such a move are
possible. The most obvious is that a process of never-ending mediation
could be strategically manipulated by one party to a mediated agreement.
More generally, the resort to litigation means that one party will no
longer agree to consensual reconstitution of the relationship. Marriage
seems the clearest example of a relationship in which mediation is likely
to be tried over and over again because of the intimacy of the parties
and because the common interest in what is shared is so great. For the
same reason, resort to litigation almost always spells the end (or radical
transformation) of a marriage. Indeed, given the general non-enforce-
ability of intra-marriage agreements, this is almost true as a matter of
law, which says in effect: "If you have to resort to litigation, the
marriage is over!"
The whole spirit and language of the litigation forum is designed to
protect rights. Litigation is dominated by a concern with lines, thresholds,
and categories, and its rhetoric is that of the determination8 of past
facts. Litigation is for this reason "instrumental" and metaphors from
the world of craft and construction come naturally to describe it.49 The
rule of law as applied in the courts attempts to maintain a relative
44. Id. at 216.
45. See G. KATEB. HANNA ARENDT POLITICS, CONSCIENCE, AND EvIL 21-22 (1983).
He criticizes Arendt for failing to realize that there are many contexts in American life
which are more or less public and more or less political in her classical sense.
46. J. DEWEY, LOGIC: THE THEORY OF INQUIRY 35 (1938).
47. Words, of course, do not merely "reflect" the relationship. They are "performative"
- they partially (re)constitute the relationship.
48. I choose this word for its instructive ambiguity in this context: to determine is
both to "find out" and to "decide."
49. Burns, Hanna Arendt's Constitutional Thought in AMOR MUNDI: EXPLORATIONS
IN THE FAITH AND THOUGHT OF HANNA ARENDT 157 (J. Bernauer ed. 1986).
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stability which hedges "the constant motion of all human affairs, a
motion which can never end as long as men are born and die."" The
possibility of litigation is an admission that not everything is subject to
renegotiation at every time." People may thus rely on relative stability
in some areas of their lives and businesses so that they can exercise
freedom in others. Often, when the parties' relationship is a limited one
for specific purposes, nonperformance will effectively end the relation-
ship. Here litigation is often most appropriate. In these relationships,
relatively few aspects of the other's concrete situation may be "relevant"
outside the business relationship. The distinctions noted here suggest
why, in the most general terms, there is a place for both mediation and
litigation; these distinctions also suggest that the relationship between
mediation and litigation will vary greatly from context to context.
The question still remains as to whether the final mediated agreement
should be viewed as binding in subsequent litigation. Again, this is not
subject to a single answer, for the very reasons largely implicit in the
performance, if not the doctrines, of courts in contracts cases. The
important point is that contract law itself - especially in the law as
practiced if not the "crystal palace"'52 of the early doctrinal systematizers
- already places the agreement in the context of the entire relationship
of the parties. It does so necessarily in the context of a relationship
where one of the parties has decided to assert his rights. The very
existence of contract law, developed through litigation, says that this is
one situation in which enforcement may be appropriate. Whether the
agreement is viewed as a kind of codification of the reconstituted
relationship or as a promise (whose meaning is, of course, to be discerned
against the background of the parties' past relationship), the many
doctrines of contract law allow enormous flexibility and range in the
way in which the courts can weigh the words of an agreement.
The promise-centered model of mediation conceived of the mediation
procedure as a period of negotiation - bargaining if you will - whose
processes are a pure means by which a promise is identified which will
control the future. 3 Here the entire goal of the process is to reach a
50. H. ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 465 (1973).
51. Accordingly, the traditional doctrine of contracts law is that courts will not rewrite
a contract for the parties. When a court does reconstitute a contractual relation in an
important case, the commentators take note. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments
Under Long-Term Supply Contracts. 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 369 (1982). This shows that the
typology developed in the text is only an analytic abstract. As Wallace Stevens said, the
"squirming facts escape the squammous mind." See T. LowI. THE END OF LIBERALISM:
THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 107-113 (2d ed: 1979) (describing the
corrupting effects of negotiation without law in the administrative enforcement process).
52. Gordon, supra note 9, at 566.
53. Goldberg identifies roughly analogous, models for the consideration of arbitration,
that close to the relational model set out above and a judicial model. See Goldberg, The
Mediation of Grievances Under a Collective Bargaining Contract: An Alternative to
Arbitration, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 270, at 271-76 (1982).
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verbal, usually written, agreement. One moves naturally, though not
inevitably,' to the conclusion that the agreement, the promise, ought
to be enforced through the normal legal processes. Instructively, there
is again a parallel here to the classical notion of contract:
Classical contract law of the type refined so superbly by Williston pre-
supposed a single moment at which the parties reached agreement on all
important terms. Before this grand meeting of the minds, there was no
contractual liability. And after this point, all important decisions -
particularly the determination of the terms governing the relationship and
the measurement of the expectation damages - could be reached only
by referring to that all encompassing agreement. Classical contract law
can be coherently applied to situations in which there is no grand meeting
of the minds, even though the parties act as though there is a contract
only by denying that contract exists at all. Courts sometimes reach that
result, but it often seems harsh because it fails to protect obvious reliance
on what the parties believed to be a valid contract. Partly for this reason,
this approach is not generally favored today."
What I hope to have shown is that from either perspective, the possible
sequence of mediation followed by litigation is a sequence that reflects
basic societal values and that any attempt to isolate the processes from
each other works against these values.
Consideration of the enforceability of mediated agreements, then,
requires that we keep two notions in mind without allowing either to
overwhelm the other. Litigation may be a necessary complement to
mediation in certain contexts; however, mediation alone may be most
productive in other contexts. Requiring litigation in mediation contexts
beyond those provided for under contract law may cause the disfigure-
ment of mediation as a process developed to care for and heal that
vast number of (often unenforceable) "exchange relations." These "ex-
change relations" have been called "contract in fact.""6 As Ian Macneil
54. See supra text accompanying notes 50 to 55.
55. Whitford, supra note 34, at 547 (footnotes omitted).
56. I. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 4-5 (1980). Macneil explicitly distin-
guishes "contract in fact" from "contract in law":
By contract I mean no more and no less than the relations among parties to the
process of projected exchange (sic) into the future .... Let me compare this with
a more traditional definition, that in Restatement (Second): "A contract is a promise
or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty." Now, this is a
definition not of contract-in-fact, but of contract-in-law. Under it, any relation, no
matter how full of exchange, not potentially giving rise to legal remedies or legal
recognition of duties is not a contract. In our law-ridden society ... this limitation
of the contract concept is in some ways less serious than it might seem. Most of
our exchange relations do in fact give rise to legal rights. But in Britain, for
example, collective bargaining is in theory outside legal enforceability. And there
exist in our society exchange relations, of which marriage is but an extreme
example, where much occurs to which the law does not, in any practical sense,
extend its remedies or recognize legal duties. Id. at 4-5 (footnotes omitted).
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has stated:
While law may be an integral part of virtually all contractual relations,
one not to be ignored, law is not what contracts are all about. Contracts
are about getting things done in the real world - building things, selling
things, cooperating in enterprise, achieving power and prestige, sharing
and competing in a family structure.... If we wish to understand contract,
and indeed if we wish to understand contract law, we must think about
exchange and such things first, and law second."
All the problems discussed by the symposium were, in effect, raised
specifically by the attempt to maintain this perspective while giving
litigation procedures their due.
The relative stability and publicity provided by positive law, formally
enforced, is often crucial."s
Positive laws in constitutional government are designed to erect boundaries
and establish channels of communication between men whose community
is continually endangered by the new men born into it. With each new
birth, a new beginning is born into the world, a new world has potentially
come into being. The stability of the laws corresponds to the constant
motion of all human affairs, a motion which can never end as long as
men are born and die. The laws hedge in each new beginning and at the
same time assure it freedom of movement, the potentiality of something
entirely new and unpredictable; the boundaries of positive law are for the
political existence of man what memory is for his historical existence:
they guarantee the pre-existence of a common world, the reality of some
continuity which transcends the individual life span of each generation,
absorbs all new origins and is nourished by them.... To abolish the fences
of law between men - as tyranny does - means to take away man's
liberties and destroy freedom as a living political reality; for the space
between men as it is hedged in by laws, is the living space of freedom. 9
57. Id. at 5.
58. The extent to which legal formalism provides stability has been highly controversial
at least since the Realist movement. See J. Dewey, Logical Method and the Law, 10
CORNELL L. Q. 17 (1924). It seems to me that this stability is a function not so much
of doctrine as of the distinctive kind of "conservative" rhetoric which necessarily accom-
panies public practice under the rule of law. The purely strategic importance of formality
in advancing the interests of disadvantaged groups has been subject to varying evaluations.
Compare R. Abel, Informalism: A Tactical Equivalent to Law? 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
375 (1985) with W. Simon, Legal Informality and Redistributive Politics, Id. at 384.
59- H. ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 465-66 (1973). Arendt's metaphors
must alert one to the dangers implicit in the metaphors of an "organic" society which
are often invoked in favor of non-formal procedures for dispute resolution. See also J.
MACMURRAY, THE FORM OF THE PERSONAL 152-53 (1961):
[A]n illusory argument ... rests upon the a priori analogical interpretation of
personal experience through biological concepts. It assumes that we become rational
in the process of growing up, and that the more rational we become the more we
grow out of our childish phantasies.... It is, indeed, the characteristic myth of
the twentieth century. Our superstitious belief that society is - or ought to be
- organic, is itself a wish for the irresponsibility of the primitive. For it is primitive
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The first general ground for valuing formal legality then, would stress
that the very formality of legal proceedings - the almost palpable
"distance" that it reflects and creates among participants - schematizes
an important human value. Truly intimate relations are for us here
below hard to come by: some ineffable intertwining of gift and achieve-
ment. The degree to which a political society should present, even as
an ideal, the image of informal mutuality, perhaps of an idealized family,
presents a basic question of political and social philosophy with a long
and complex history.' An important perspective here would stress the
central place that "relatively impersonal relations" have in human life
and might counsel against an unreflective aversion to the procedures
that embody such relations even as necessarily second best.
Another general consideration underlying the defense of procedural
formality stresses what might be called the tendency toward equality
arguably implicit in formal proceedings. For example, after conceding
that adversaries in litigation are rarely equal, Richard Abel writes:
Nevertheless, only within the legal system can advocates even hope to
pursue the ideal of equal justice in a society ridden by inequalities of
class, race, and gender and dominated by the power of capital and state.
Formal law cannot eliminate substantive social inequalities, but it can
limit their influence. Law is the sole arena within which unequals can
hope to achieve justice. Only equals can risk a confrontation within the
informal processes of the economy and the polity. Certainly advocates can
imagine, and should strive for, a society that has overcome the inequalities
that presently divide us; in such a society, informal processes could play
a more prominent role. But until that millennium comes, formality is the
best, often the only, defense against power. Informalism is not an equivalent
to law, either tactically or morally."
I will return to these very basic questions later, but for now let me
say that enforceability, and thus the relationship between mediation and
litigation, largely sets the stage for other mediation issues. Much of the
discussion on each of the issues focused on exactly this interrelationship
between the processes of mediation and the processes of adjudication.
One minority view (expressed by a participant in the active practice of
litigation) urged that mediated agreements ought not to be enforceable;
society which is as nearly organic in form as a human society can be, and social
development moves away from the organic type - the ideal zero of human
association. The more society becomes civilized, the more artificial it is; that is to
say, the more it depends upon the artifices of practical rationality. The institutions
by which society maintains itself are not natural; they are artifacts, and they are
maintained by effort in order to sustain the personal life of men and women, and
to prevent a relapse into the barbarism of a nearly organic life.
60. See McKeon, The Development of the Concept of Property in Political Philosophy:
A Study of the Background of the Constitution, 49 INrL J. ETHICS 297 (1938).
61. R. Abel, Informalism: A Tactical Equivalent to Law? 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
375, 383 (1985); See also Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
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any subsequent litigation should be about the underlying claim and not
about the mediation and the agreement it produced. The argument was
that the possibility that the mediation might be subject to examination
and exploration in the very different litigation forum would so affect
the attitudes of the parties as to destroy what is distinctive about the
mode of social ordering presented by mediation. The proponents of a
mediator privilege and mediator immunity were in effect seeking to
foster what is distinctive about mediation, through ethical codes, without
those codes being "used against" mediators in the hostile, and distinc-
tively adversarial context of litigation. The notion seemed to be that,
on the immunity issues, for example, positive developments that would
enrich the development of mediation as a preferred method of social
ordering would be distorted by the need to keep one eye on what the
litigators would do with the development, much like the claim by some
medical professionals that the spectra of litigation distorts the practice
of medicine.
Underlying the discussion as well were very different conceptions of
the "coercive power of the state" and its relationship to the mode of
social ordering that mediation offers. Some argued from within what
might be called a purely positivist notion of legal institutions. The
criteria that were likely to be employed when a case came to be litigated
were likely to be alien to the preferences and values of the parties: to
be imposed by the distant stranger at the bench after technical and
alien rituals. The coercive nature of adjudication is viewed as the sign
that a doom is being pronounced ab extra, without justification in the
preferences or the legitimate interests of the parties. Indeed this view
is consistent with the attitude that Macaulay has found to prevail among
businessmen for whom "state-enforced norms and sanctions in the gov-
ernance of contract relations"62 are generally of secondary importance.
He characterizes "the occasional resort by private parties to formal legal
sanctions as mostly opportunistic and tactical: by going to law, the
parties are not appealing to shared values embodied in legal rules, or
seeking moral- vindication of their position or a just settlement of their
disputes; they are usually engaged in maneuvers to improve their bar-
gaining positions." 63 In this view such businessmen are "seen as inhabiting
overlapping and to some extent mutually contradicting moral universes
of contracting rules, one of which (their private order) supplies the
norms that they actually internalize"'' and which could be brought to
bear on any mediated agreement. The legal order, in this picture, provides
parties only "an arsenal of strategic weapons in case the relation breaks
62. Gordon, supra note 9 at 573.
63. Id. at 572.
64. Id.
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down." 65
The alternative view found that the coercive power of court-made
law merely assured that our moral judgments on matters of public
concern, on matters of social ethics, will be effective in the real world."
Even Macaulay did not want to be understood as romanticizing informally
structured long-term relationships unaffected by formal procedures:
Power, exploitation, and dependence also are significant. Continuing re-
lationships are not necessarily nice. The value of arrangements locks some
people into dependent positions. They can only take orders. The actual
lines of a bureaucratic structure may be much more extensive than formal
ones. Seemingly independent actors may have little real freedom and
discretion in light of the costs of offending dominant parties. Once they
face sunk costs and comfortable patterns, the possibility of command
rather than negotiation increases. In some situations parties may see
relational sanctions as inadequate in view of the risks involved.... [T]oday
I would stress that relational sanctions do not always produce cooperation
or happy situations. Trust can be misplaced.... When long-term continuing
relations do collapse, those disadvantaged often turn to contract law and
legal action.67
Just as Americans have traditionally transformed their political ques-
tions into legal questions, so too we seem inclined to transform substantive
legal questions into procedural questions. We have understood that the
spirit of the forum within which a question is decided can be at least
as important as the substantive standard that the court "applies." It
seems that there are important questions of political judgment affecting
what sorts of issues are best adjudicated and what sorts are best mediated,
and the related question of which procedure ought more to defer to
the other. No less subtle are questions concerning the likely effects of
different institutionalizations of the mediation-litigation relationship and
the collateral rules that "protect" the processes from one another. All
these questions are and ought to be highly context-specific.
V. BARGAINING ABOUT ENFORCEABILITY
Finally, I want to discuss briefly the issue of whether mediated
agreements should be unenforceable absent an explicit agreement pro-
viding for enforceability. Minnesota's Civil Mediation Act68 embodies
these issues in a clear fashion. The statute provides:
Effect of mediated settlement agreement. The effect of a mediated set-
65. Id. at 572-73.
66. Fiss, supra note 61.
67. Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 Wis. L. R. 469, 471 (1985)
(footnotes omitted).
68. MINN. STAT. § 572.35 (1986).
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tlement agreement shall be determined under principles of law applicable
to contract. A mediated settlement agreement is not binding unless it
contains a provision stating that it is binding and a provision stating
substantially that the parties were advised in writing that (a) the mediator
has no duty to protect their interests or provide them with information
about their legal rights; (b) signing a mediated settlement agreement may
adversely affect their legal rights; and (c) they should consult an attorney
before signing a mediated settlement agreement if they are uncertain of
their legal rights.'
California's original Neighborhood Dispute Resolution Bill likewise
provided that agreement to participate in a dispute resolution process
was not binding: "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit
any person who voluntarily consents to dispute resolution from revoking
his consent, withdrawing from dispute resolution, and seeking judicial
redress prior to reaching an agreement."' The bill took a similarly
restrictive attitude toward the enforceability of the substantive provisions
of mediated agreements: "A written resolution agreement shall not be
enforceable in a court nor shall it be admissible as evidence in any
judicial or administrative proceeding unless such agreement contains a
provision which clearly sets forth the intent of the parties that such
agreement shall be enforceable in a court or admissible as evidence."'"
The latter provision would, in effect, reverse the usual legal effect of
an agreement where the elements of contract formation were present.
What arguments might support this position?
In general, there is no legal necessity for parties to know that they
are binding themselves contractually. One concern seems to be that
persons may -easily misconstrue the relatively "personal" context of
mediation and may think that they move solely within the world of
consensual ordering. The question is whether there is need for a rule
that focuses the attention of the parties in mediation on the issue of
enforceability. One answer turns again largely on basic philosophical
commitments toward the status of legal "coercion."
Another answer might focus on the special characteristics of mediation
as a form of social ordering, a subject on which Lon Fuller has written
perhaps the classic article in legal literature.' Fuller argued that me-
diation was especially appropriate under certain circumstances such as
when two parties are locked in a situation of bilateral monopoly, and
69. It appears that the provision that the agreement is binding does not serve to lFmit
the normal application of contract principles to the evaluation of the agreement. It is an
additional requirement.
70. Freedman, State Legislation on Dispute Resolution app. I-Calif., ABA Special
Comm. on Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution (1982) (quoting AB 2730 § 1143.22,
as introduced Mar. 4, 1980).
71. Id. (quoting AB 2730 § 1143.19(c) as introduced Mar. 4, 1980).
72. Fuller, supra note 32.
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agreement is necessary for the continued existence of the parties. It is
also appropriate where there is some element of economic trade in the
interaction, but beyond that, each has an interest in creating a consti-
tution, that is, a set of words that would allow them to live together
successfully in a way that relates their plural interests to their joint
endeavor.73
Fuller identified the central quality of mediation as "its capacity to
reorient the parties toward each other, not by imposing rules on them,
but by helping them to achieve a new and shared perception of their
relationship, a perception that will direct their attitudes and dispositions
toward one another."74 This characteristic "becomes most visible when
the proper function of the mediator turns out to be, not that of inducing
the parties to accept formal rules for the governance of their future
relations, but that of helping them to free themselves from the en-
cumbrance of rules and of accepting, instead, a relationship of mutual
respect, trust and understanding that will enable them to meet shared
contingencies with the aid of formal prescriptions laid down in advance.""5
Indeed, one of the tasks of the mediator might well be to "break up
formalized conceptions of 'duty' and to substitute a more fluid sense
of mutual trust and shared responsibility[:] ... instead of working toward
achieving a rule-oriented relationship he might devote his efforts, to
some degree at least, in exactly the opposite direction."'76 Thus, Fuller
claimed, it was no accident that mediation seemed the most appropriate
means for addressing disputes within a marriage and that contracts
apportioning rights and duties within the marriage relationship had, at
the time at which he wrote, generally not be enforceable in the courts.'
The latter is true, he argued, because the legalization that enforcement
would entail would be destructive of the trust necessary for a living
marriage and that marriage contained too many shifting contingencies
for the "rules" contained in act-oriented contracts to be effective.
The suggestion here is that if the focus of the mediation should be
the restoration of the relationship between the parties, then focusing
the parties' attention on the construction of an agreement that is legally
enforceable might distract the parties from the key task, that of restoring
the tissue of their relationship. The very focus on issues such as en-
forceability (and thus, for example, the severability of unenforceable
provisions) would contribute to the same "legalization" that mediation
promises to cure.
73. Id. at 309-12. Fuller also indicated that examining mediation in the labor-man-
agement collective bargaining setting is particularly helpful for analyzing mediation's
characteristics and its applicability to other situations.
74. Id. at 325.
75. Id. at 325-26.
76. Id. at 326.
77. Id. at 330-32.
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It is, for example, the perceived increase in "legalization" of the
processes of arbitration and resulting alienation of workers from that
process that led Goldberg to propose a modified mediation method for
the resolution of contract grievances:
The mediation process, however, compels a different approach. It eliminates
the concept of "winning" a grievance, substituting the concept of nego-
tiations leading to a mutually satisfactory resolution. To the extent that
the parties focus on seeking a mutually satisfactory outcome through
negotiations, they should develop a mutual understanding of each other's
concerns. This mutual understanding, in turn, should lead hot only to the
resolution of more grievances without resort to mediation or arbitration,
but also to the improvement of their entire relationship.78
Both Goldberg and Fuller present typologies which attempt to specify
what kinds of problems arising in various relationships are most suitable
for mediation. Fuller, for example, argues that mediation is inappropriate
in circumstances where human relationships are best ordered by act-
oriented rules:
It is not difficult to see why, under a system of state-made law, the
standard measure of dispute settlement should be adjudication and not
mediation. If the question is whether A drove through a red light ...
even the most ardent advocate of conciliative procedures would hardly
recommend mediation as the standard way of dealing with such problems.
A pervasive use of mediation could here obliterate the essential guideposts
and boundary markers men need in orienting their actions toward one
another and could end by producing a situation in whigh one could know
precisely where he stood or how he might get where he wanted to be....
[T]here are circumstances in which it is essential to work hard toward
keeping things black and white. Maintaining a legal system in functioning
order is one of those occasions."
Fuller suggests that while mediation should not be used when the
relationship is best organized by impersonal act-oriented rules, it cannot
be used where the problem presented is not amenable to solution through
mediational processes.10 More concretely, Goldberg suggests that me-
diation is relatively unsuitable for grievances that turn on complex
factual issues, those that raise issues in which the reasoning is more
important than the result, and where the interests of the parties are so
great and their positions so strongly held that they are unlikely to reach
a compromise settlement or to accept an advisory opinion. Goldberg
78. Goldberg, supra note 53 at 283.
79. Fuller, supra note 32 at 328. See Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The
Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil
Cases, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1808 (1986).
80. Fuller, supra note 32 at 330.
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does add that even under those circumstances mediation will often lead
to a solutibn, often a solution more responsive to the parties' real interests
than one that might be imposed in adjudication.'
In other words, mediation may be used (and useful) in a continuum
of circumstances, some of which are relatively far removed from what
Fuller takes to be the "natural home" of mediation, which is dispute
resolution within an ongoing marriage." At the opposite end of the
continuum are situations in which a lawsuit has been filed before the
parties enter mediation, and the parties, who may have an ongoing
relationship or perhaps are engaged in a one-time transaction, are thus
formal adversaries. State legislation that would limit enforceability might
also limit the range of disputes for which mediation was a significant
option, at least if enforceability were generally denied.
A conclusion that the parties ought not to focus on enforceability
does not mean that the agreement ought not to be enforceable. En-
forceability perhaps may not be something that ought to be "bargained
over." Its importance may be that it acts as a vague threat, a kind of
legitimation in both the senses of rightness and effectiveness. 3 If so,
enforceability may perhaps be a kind of background condition not subject
to the same kind of bargaining as other issues. The paradox is that the
attempt to "delegalize" the process by focusing on enforcement as an
issue may prove self-defeating. The wisdom of the Minnesota rule thus
depends on the empirical and normative soundness of the view that
making enforceability an explicit subject for the mediation contributes
to an empirically identifiable result (compliance?) judged valuable.
This raises the question of what a "good" mediation feature is and,
thus necessarily, what a "good" mediation is. One way of identifying
the features of good mediation practice is external or statistical: will
the feature lead to more persons choosing mediation as their preferred
method of dispute resolution and will the feature lead to a higher
percentage of mediations resulting in agreements? Without a change in
principle one might also ask: will the feature lead to a higher number
of mediated agreements that are honored by both parties? One can
make the latter an independent value or view it merely as instrumental
to the agreement on the assumption that parties will be more likely to
agree if they know they are bound. Some persons, of course, may be
more likely to agree if they know they are bound, especially if the other
party will have to "perform" first, as, for example, by the dismissal of
criminal charges or the payment of restitution. Is it then a plausible
hypothesis that people who intend to abide by what they agree to will
be more likely to agree if they know that the agreement is enforceable?
81. Goldberg, supra note 53 at 300-01.
82. See supra text at 52-53.
83. MACNEIL, supra note 29 at 93.
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Is there likely to be a higher level of compliance if the parties explicitly
discuss and agree to enforceability, or should enforceability, which is
often not a realistic option, remain a brooding omnipresence?
It may be that enforceability, even in circumstances where the
"relational" and "problem-solving" aspects of the situation are para-
mount, might serve as a kind of symbol for the seriousness with which
the parties should honestly face all the issues that would likely arise
as they continue their relationship (even where they would not in fact
resort to the courts in the event of a breach). This is what Fuller alluded
to in recalling the words of an attorney experienced in putting together
complex business arrangements:
If you negotiate the contract thoroughly, explore carefully the problems
that can arise in the course of its administration, work out the proper
language to cover the various contingencies that may develop, you can
then put the contract in a drawer and forget it. What he meant was that
in the exchange that accompanied the negotiation and drafting of the
contract the parties would come to understand each other's problems
sufficiently so that when difficulties arose they would, as fair and reasonable
men, be able to make the appropriate adjustments without referring to
the contract itself."
It may thus be that, in most contexts, enforceability should remain a
"background condition,"" unless, as an empirical matter, discussion of
and agreement on enforceability is likely to enhance performance.
VI. CONCLUSION
No persuasive general argument exists for giving the mediated nature
of an agreement necessary legal consequences. Contract law provides a
flexible set of considerations relevant to the issue of enforceability that
more adequately structure deliberation about that issue than could any
single general rule. The interrelation of mediation and litigation poses
special problems for both forms of social ordering, but only a procedural
purist would drive a sharp wedge between them, a wedge that would,
in the contexts where contract law provides for enforceability, probably
reduce the value of mediation. Finally, there are good reasons to think
that enforceability should not itself generally be a subject of the me-
diation, though here there is ample room for further empirical research
and normative analysis.
84. Fuller, supra note 32 at 326-27.
85. J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 85-89 (1971).
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